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This is heresy, of course, coming from a lawyer, a law profes-
sor, a person who makes his living teaching and writing about fed-
eral courts. It probably is not politically correct. But I think I am 
right, and I think thoughtful people who step back from the process 
of government by injunction would agree. 
This should be a matter of concern no matter what your poli-
tics. The power over state institutions first claimed in the good fight 
to end de jure segregation is not limited to any area of public policy. 
It can be pressed into the service of a conservative agenda just as 
easily, with citations to the applications discussed in this book as 
precedents.29 
Let me end with a quotation from a book by Gerald N. Rosen-
berg that Professor Kemerer and Judge Justice ought to read. 
Aptly titled, The Hollow Hope - Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change?, the concluding paragraph reads: 
American courts are not all-powerful institutions. They were 
designed with severe limitations and placed in a political system 
of divided powers. To ask them to produce significant social re-
form is to forget their history and ignore their constraints. It is 
to cloud our vision with a naive and romantic belief in the tri-
umph of rights over politics. And while romance and even na-
ivete have their charms, they are not best exhibited in 
courtrooms. 3o 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? By Gerald N. Rosenberg. I Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 425. Cloth, 
$29.95. 
Samuel Krislov2 
The Hollow Hope is an exciting and challenging volume which 
contests contemporary liberal over-valuation of courts as instru-
ments of social change. There is a danger that it will be mistaken 
for a trendy tract, but it is a far more serious venture, a book that 
not imagine how true community can be achieved on the local, state and national levels. 
However, I hope my pessimism is just that. 
29. See note 24. 
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demands intellectual attention and regard. At the same time, I do 
have some serious reservations. Rosenberg's answers by and large 
seem right, but the question he asks is badly flawed, which colors 
the whole effort. Additionally, the marshalling of evidence is er-
ratic and even obtuse. It is a mark of the seriousness and scope of 
Rosenberg's effort that it rises above these evident faults to join the 
list of major works on implementation. 
The volume is organized around two models of Supreme Court 
effectiveness: the "dynamic court model" and the "constrained 
court" model. The first is a broadly painted, command, almost 
King Canute notion. The "constrained court" model notes condi-
tions for success-the need for political allies, the presence of ele-
ments of luke-warm opposition to change that can be persuaded to 
accept a court decision, etc. Underlying social trends should also be 
supportive of the court's efforts. The question Rosenberg poses is 
essentially which of the two models most closely approximates the 
Supreme Court's achievements and failures. 
Directly confronting the key and most impressive Supreme 
Court efforts at reform--desegregation, legalization of abortion, 
criminal justice, women's equality and reapportionment-Rosen-
berg concludes that given the constraints and the conditions, the 
constrained court view is the most accurate. Furthermore, he ar-
gues, U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of signifi-
cant social reform. Judge Posner tells us in the blurbs that it will 
"cause many lawyers to revise their view of the relation between law 
and society." 
Except for the extreme nature of the ultimate conclusions, even 
moderately informed students of the judicial process would cer-
tainly expect vindication of the "constrained court" model. Indeed, 
Rosenberg has some problems finding advocates of the "dynamic 
court;" among them he lists Joel Handler, who was one of the first 
scholars who helped to alert us (in the heady 1970s, not the more 
conservative 1990s) that Court power was not unbounded. 
It is not merely that the "dynamic court" is a straw-man. By 
concentrating on what is essentially a non-question the focus is not 
precise enough to permit the answer Rosenberg finally reaches. In-
deed, since in at least four instances-women's rights and abortion 
and reapportionment and environment-he finds the "constrained 
view" too unsubtle to capture what was accomplished, it is not clear 
how the cumulative conclusion of ineffectiveness was reached. 
What is clear is that more sensitive answers would have been 
reached had the question been posed as one exploring the condi-
tions of success. Admittedly the book would have been less bold, 
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less intellectually challenging, and attracted less attention had it 
been so structured. 
Wrestling with Rosenberg's evidence is half the fun of the 
book. He has taken on the toughest cases, and the tour de force in 
denying court efficacy in Brown earns some sort of medal for intel-
lectual audacity. 
Chapter 4, which denies that Brown had an impact on the 
moral sensibility of the country, is as fascinating as it is unconvinc-
ing. Rosenberg makes this odd case by quite accurately noting the 
slowdown in desegregation that had occurred prior to the Powell 
Amendment and by reminding us of the linkage of successful inte-
gration to federal school funding. It is incontestible that this was 
the key to substantial compliance in the deep South. But there is no 
discussion of the immediate impact of Brown in desegregating not 
merely the border states, but also south-like enclaves in northern 
states like Indiana and Kansas-and most important symboli-
cally-the District of Columbia. Nor does he acknowledge that the 
Court's effectiveness continued to be felt in both ongoing federal 
court decisions and in such decisions as Virginia's own Supreme 
Court rulings which de-legitimized that state's massive resistance. 
This reflects a basic problem with his test of "social reform." 
There is no measure of effectiveness advanced other than that it be 
nationwide and concern more than one agency; there is also implicit 
definition via a list of social reforms of our time. But apparently no 
partial successes count. In a number of instances, ostensible goals 
quoted in the cases are discounted. For example, Rosenberg argues 
that Roe implies that hospitals had a legal obligation to provide 
abortions; therefore, the development of abortion clinics was a 
symptom offailure. Perhaps the Justices intended to bind hospitals, 
but nothing he cites in the cases or my own reading allows me to 
reach his plane of understanding of their goals. 
The difficulty with this ali-or-nothing approach is basic, and 
painfully evident in the public administration literature on imple-
mentation and even in his own comments on other institutions. 
Courts are not less efficient or in any way distinctly different from 
other institutions. How often does Congress, the President, Solidar-
ity or a Leninist cadre single-handedly effect "social reform"? In 
how many instances is a policy realized precisely as the progenitors 
envisioned it? Would not someone studying congressional impact 
note the need for presidential, bureaucratic, or local assistance? 
Would not they note many instances where institutions succeeded 
only because of the coming of the "least dangerous branch" to the 
rescue of the "powerful" President or Congress? 
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The news that courts are bounded should come as no surprise, 
but for those who need that message this is a strong dose. Judging 
by the naivete of many of the witnesses at Senate confirmation hear-
ings, sales to that audience alone would make the book a mild best-
seller. 
His conclusion that court actions do not mobilize support is in 
part built on questionable evidence. Rosenberg explains away the 
growth of support when time-series analysis suggests the court has 
had an impact, but stops whenever an analysis is negative or incon-
clusive. Even less justifiably, he ignores evidence he stumbles upon 
and uses dubious measures. Thus, he mentions the emergence of 
the Southern Education Reporting Service (but not its companion 
Race Relations Law Reporter), but it does not occur to him that 
such new media resources, such as the post-Roe emergence of MS, 
represent a better test of enhanced public attention than the totality 
of articles listed in the Readers' Guide or the percentage of columns 
in the New York Times Index devoted to the topic. Those curious 
and insensitive measures are used throughout the volume, but are 
barely justified and for the first time on page 289. He cites public 
opinion polls indicating no growth in support and, though noting 
others that come to different conclusions, does not provide sufficient 
data to overcome the suspicion that his data are selective. 
On the other hand, the proposition that a Supreme Court deci-
sion can provoke opposition is amply supported by his data. Thus 
he seriously advances the argument that interest groups must assess 
the costs and benefits of concentrating efforts in the judicial arena. 
He argues that in many instances litigating groups should sharply 
reassess their strategies and opt for political over litigation goals. 
Surely he is correct about this, especially in the light of the growing 
conservativism of the courts. He provides evidence of groups beg-
garing themselves through litigation, thereby handicapping political 
advancement of their cause. Still, he provides no evidence on rela-
tive costs of political over legal mobilization. He does not attempt 
to explain why legal efforts do not maximize the efforts of groups 
with limited resources, as they would superficially seem to do. His 
argument should give groups pause and lead them to recalculate 
costs and benefits more carefully. But those groups would be as 
oblivious to reality as he claims they have been in the past if they 
fail to factor in a probability that many political victories also must 
be re-fought in the legal arena. 
